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Maple

Open Source
7.6
out of 10
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IP AnonymizationUndisclosed
Storage ModelZero-access encrypted
RetentionSession-only by default
Provider TrainingContractual no-train
JurisdictionUnited States
Free TierLimited free tier
Telemetryopt-out
Established2025
WebWindowsmacOSLinuxAndroidiOS
GLMKimiDeepSeekGPT-OSSGemmaLlama
Pro (individual, monthly)
$20.00/mo
Max (individual, monthly)
$100.00/mo
Team (per user, monthly)
$30.00/mo

Published September 30, 2026Updated November 13, 2026By Juan Martinez

In This Article

Maple is an AI chat and research workspace from Maple Privacy Labs Inc., a company in Austin, Texas that launched the product in January 2025. Its distinguishing claim is architectural rather than contractual: messages are encrypted on the user’s device, and the only place they are ever decrypted is inside a hardware-isolated enclave whose running code can be cryptographically matched against public source. The models are open-weight releases deployed by Maple itself, so no request is forwarded to an outside model vendor. What the product does not have is a security audit (Maple says a SOC 2 audit is in progress), a track record longer than roughly twenty-two months, or an annual billing discount.

Privacy Architecture

The design starts one step earlier than most privacy-positioned AI products. Messages are encrypted locally before they leave the device, so what arrives at Maple’s servers is ciphertext rather than a prompt. Decryption happens inside AWS Nitro Enclaves — a trusted execution environment that, in Maple’s own description of the properties it relies on, provides CPU and memory isolation, ephemeral storage, and no external network connectivity, with outbound traffic forced over a vsock channel to a proxy on the parent instance. The parent instance, and therefore Maple’s own operators, cannot reach into the enclave to read what is being processed.

Two mechanisms turn that from a statement into something checkable. Enclave images are measured at boot, producing a PCR0 hash that identifies the code running inside. A remote attestation document, signed by AWS Nitro hardware, then proves the enclave’s identity to a party outside it. Maple says its app runs this check at the start of every session: it asks the enclave for an attestation document, checks a fresh nonce, the certificate chain to Amazon’s published Nitro root certificate and the signature, and compares the PCR0 fingerprint with a list built into the app and with a signed history file in its GitHub repository. If a check fails, no encrypted session is created and nothing is sent.

The check has limits, and Maple states them. A fingerprint match means Maple approved that software, not that it was built from the public source; rebuilding the image with the Nix command documented in the repository and comparing the PCR values is what ties the two together. The model runs in its own attested enclave, which Maple’s enclave verifies before forwarding a prompt, so a user checks Maple’s enclave rather than the model’s directly. In a browser, the code that runs the check is served by Maple on each page load, so Maple recommends the desktop app, or Maple Proxy built from source, for anyone who needs more than that. Maple Work, the desktop agent, runs its models in the same enclaves, but its hand-offs, web search and connected apps sit outside that promise.

Maple is explicit about what a user still has to trust, which is a short and specific list: the four things the proof rests on: Amazon’s Nitro hardware, the published code, Maple’s signing key for approved releases, and the model’s enclave. Put another way, a user has to trust that the Nitro hardware performs as documented, that the enclave code does what it says, and that the attestation confirms the approved software is running. The company frames its own approach against two others. Standard AI services process prompts in plaintext on the provider’s servers. Privacy proxies place an intermediary in front of a model vendor, but the vendor still sees plaintext, and as Maple puts it, zero-data-retention there is a policy promise rather than a guarantee. The architectural comparison it draws for its own model is Apple’s Private Cloud Compute, which uses custom silicon with a Secure Enclave where Maple uses AWS Nitro Enclaves with attestation-verified code — different hardware, the same shape of guarantee, with data processing isolated in hardware and the software environment verified cryptographically.

The models matter to this architecture more than the marketing line suggests. The banner text promises models by OpenAI, Google, Kimi and Z.ai, which is true only of those companies’ open-weight releases — GPT-OSS 120B rather than a GPT flagship, Gemma 4 31B rather than Gemini. In practice the roster is GLM 5.3 and GLM-5.3 Flash, Kimi K3.1 Pro, DeepSeek V4.1 Flash and an abliterated Uncensored variant of it, GPT-OSS 120B, Gemma 4 31B and Llama 3.3 70B, with a GPT-OSS Safeguard model through the API only. That is a limitation on raw capability and a considerable gain on privacy, because it means Maple runs the weights itself inside the enclave instead of relaying prompts to someone else’s API. The company states the consequence plainly: user data never touches OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek or Google as companies. There is no external provider to extract a no-training commitment from, because there is no external provider in the request path.

Maple says each account uses a personal encryption key, and its Privacy Notice describes stored memory data as sitting in a personal encrypted vault that Maple cannot access. The Maple Proxy product extends the same enclave path to third-party tools such as OpenCode, Hermes and OpenClaw, so using an outside client does not mean leaving the isolated processing environment.

One field is left unstated because Maple does not state it: there is no separate claim about how the user’s IP address is handled at the network layer, distinct from the encryption of message content. Encryption before transmission is not the same guarantee as an operator that cannot see where a request came from, and Maple makes only the first claim.

Trust & Transparency

The source code is public in full under the MIT license, in a single repository holding both the client and the enclave-side backend. That second half is the part that carries weight — a published client with a closed server would leave the reproducible-build claim unverifiable, since the thing being attested runs on the server side. Development is visibly active rather than a one-time code drop: more than 4,300 commits, 89 releases with the latest at v3.4.8, and 21 contributors.

Retention is specified in the Privacy Notice. By default, conversational data processed without memory features enabled is not retained once the session ends. Enabling memory changes that deliberately: conversations and learned preferences are kept in a per-user encrypted vault for as long as the feature stays on, and users can view, export, selectively delete or wipe that memory, or switch the feature off. Deleting the account deletes the encrypted conversational data, subject to legal retention obligations. Account metadata — name, email, payment information — is held while the account is active and for a reasonable period afterwards for compliance. Data pulled in from connected services such as Gmail, Google Drive, Apple Health or Notion, when a user authorises the connection, is processed inside the same encrypted environment and not passed to third parties except where the law requires it.

There is one collection disclosure that does not sit under any of that encryption. The Privacy Notice states that Maple automatically collects IP addresses, browser and device characteristics, operating system, language, referring URLs, device name, country, location and information about how and when the services are used, plus request volume, timestamps and error logs for API use, described as needed for the security and operation of the service and for internal analytics and reporting. The notice describes no control for it. This is ordinary web analytics collection, and it is separate from message content, but a user who assumes the encryption story covers everything the company holds would be assuming too much.

The company is young and the record is correspondingly short. Maple Privacy Labs was founded by Mark Suman, the CEO, a former Apple engineer focused on AI and privacy who was previously Director of Mobile at Instructure Canvas, and Anthony Ronning, the CTO, an infrastructure engineer with a background in defense, security, networking and bitcoin who built the TEE architecture the product runs on. Both are named publicly with traceable histories. The company reports 5x user growth over six months and better than 90% month-over-month retention among paying customers; those are its own figures, not audited ones. It lists participation in the NVIDIA Inception and Google Cloud for Startups programs.

No security breach or incident affecting Maple has surfaced. Maple says it has not been audited yet and is working toward a SOC 2 audit, so the attestation and the public code carry all the verification, and they only help users who actually run the check.

Jurisdiction is the United States, with the operating entity based in Austin, Texas. That carries none of the specific legal protections some privacy products build their positioning on, and the US participates in the intelligence-sharing arrangement usually called the Fourteen Eyes. The mitigation here is structural rather than legal: a company that holds only per-user encrypted blobs, with the decryption keys inside a TEE and on user devices, has less to produce under compulsion than one holding readable logs.

Features

Maple Chat is the chat and research workspace. Maple Work is a desktop agent for Mac, Windows and Linux that works in a project folder, runs commands and finishes tasks; it is included with Pro, Max and Team. Maple Teams covers organisations, and Maple Proxy exposes an OpenAI-compatible endpoint that routes third-party tools through the same encrypted enclaves.

Free accounts get chats encrypted on the device and web search. Web search matters here because the open-weight models on offer are smaller than proprietary flagships and benefit from outside context. What free accounts do not get is API access.

Pro unlocks every model and lets users switch between GLM, Kimi, DeepSeek and GPT-OSS within the product, along with image and document upload, voice, Maple Work and API access. Usage is metered in dollars: Pro includes $20 of usage a month, spent at each model’s listed per-million-token price, from one balance shared by Chat, Maple Work and the API. Max includes $200 of usage and early access to features and models, with the same models and prices as Pro. Team gives each seat the Pro feature set with double the per-user usage, a shared credit pool and unified billing.

Usability

Coverage is broad for a product this young: native applications for Windows, macOS 11.0 and later, Linux, Android and iOS, plus a browser version that needs no install. On Linux, Ubuntu 24.04 or newer is the officially supported target, with AppImage, .deb and .rpm packages; Maple says other distributions are not officially supported and older releases may not run it.

The onboarding is quick by the company’s own account, with download, signup and a first encrypted chat inside a minute. An account is required; there is no anonymous entry point.

One Maple account works on the phone, the computer and the web app.

The free tier has no API access, and image and document upload, voice and Maple Work are on paid plans, so evaluating the full product means paying.

Price & Value

Pro is $20 a month, Max is $100 a month, and Team is $30 per user per month. Maple lists no annual discount and no introductory rate at any tier — a single monthly rate with no renewal step-up. Each plan includes a dollar amount of usage (Pro $20, Max $200), and extra credits are bought at standard prices and never charged automatically.

At $20, the privacy architecture is included in the plan rather than charged separately. The models are open-weight rather than frontier, and the dollar allowance goes further on lighter models than on heavy ones. Whether that trade is worth $20 depends on whether the enclave guarantee is something a given user needs.

Max at $100 buys $200 of usage and early access, but no model or feature Pro lacks — it is a volume plan, and only a heavy user hitting the Pro ceiling regularly gets value from a fivefold price increase. Team at $30 per seat adds double the per-user usage, pooled credits and one invoice.

The free tier covers encrypted chat and web search, which is enough to see how the product behaves; it has no API access.

Pros and Cons

  • Messages are encrypted on the device before transmission and decrypted only inside a hardware-isolated AWS Nitro Enclave, so Maple's own operators cannot read them
  • Enclave images are measured at boot into a PCR0 hash, and a remote attestation document signed by AWS Nitro hardware identifies which code is running; the app checks it at the start of every session
  • Both the client and the enclave-side server code are public under the MIT license, so the image can be rebuilt from source and its PCR values compared
  • Open-weight models are deployed on Maple's own infrastructure inside the enclave, so prompts are never forwarded to an outside model vendor
  • Session-only retention by default, with persistence only when the user turns on memory, and full view, export and delete controls over that memory
  • Each account uses a personal encryption key, and memory data is kept in a personal encrypted vault Maple says it cannot access
  • One account works on phone, computer and the web app
  • Active public development with more than 4,300 commits, 89 releases and 21 contributors
  • Web search is available on the free tier, which matters given that the models on offer are open-weight rather than frontier
  • Native clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, Android and iOS plus a browser version, and the Maple Work desktop agent on Pro, Max and Team
  • Both founders are publicly named with verifiable backgrounds, including a CTO who built the enclave architecture
  • Flat monthly pricing with no introductory rate that later jumps
  • A matching attestation fingerprint shows Maple approved the software, not that it was built from the public source, and the in-browser check runs code served by Maple
  • No security audit yet; Maple says a SOC 2 audit is in progress
  • No separate claim about how the user's IP address is handled at the network layer, distinct from message encryption
  • The Privacy Notice discloses automatic collection of IP address, device and browser details, country, location, referring URLs and usage information, with no described control over it
  • The marketing line about running models by OpenAI and Google refers to their open-weight releases, not their flagship proprietary models
  • Maple Work's hand-offs, web search and connected apps sit outside the enclave promise
  • On Linux only Ubuntu 24.04 and newer is officially supported
  • The free tier has no API access, and upload, voice and Maple Work require a paid plan
  • No annual discount at any tier
  • Max at $100 a month adds usage headroom and early access but no model or feature beyond Pro
  • An account is required; there is no anonymous way to use the product
  • The company launched in January 2025, which gives it a short operating record
  • Based in the United States, a jurisdiction with no particular legal protections for this kind of service

Our Rating

Maple suits someone who wants the confidentiality guarantee to rest on hardware and public source rather than on a policy page, and who is willing to accept open-weight models in exchange. The combination of client-side encryption, enclave-only decryption, published server code and reproducible builds is a genuinely stronger structure than a retention promise, and one account works across every client. It suits someone less well if they need frontier-model capability, if they run Linux on anything other than a recent Ubuntu, or if they want an audit before trusting a young company. The missing audit is the sharpest gap, because the attestation shows Maple approved a fingerprint and leaves the user to rebuild the image to tie it to the source.

  • Privacy Architecture9.0/10

    Client-side encryption before anything leaves the device, decryption only inside hardware-isolated AWS Nitro Enclaves with boot-time code measurement and remote attestation, reproducible builds against public source, and open-weight models run on Maple's own infrastructure so no outside model vendor receives the traffic — held back from the top by the absence of any separate IP-handling claim and by an attestation that shows Maple approved a fingerprint rather than proving it was built from the public source

  • Trust & Transparency7.5/10

    Both client and enclave-side server code are public under the MIT license with active development, retention behaviour is stated precisely and tied to a user-controlled feature, and the two founders are named with verifiable backgrounds — set against a company founded in 2025 with no security audit yet (Maple says a SOC 2 audit is in progress) and a US base that carries no special legal protection

  • Features7.0/10

    Six open-weight model families with switching between them, web search on the free tier, plus image and document upload, voice, the Maple Work desktop agent and an OpenAI-compatible proxy API on paid plans — but usage is metered in dollars against each model's per-token price, and Maple Work's hand-offs, web search and connected apps sit outside the enclave promise

  • Usability7.0/10

    Five native clients plus the web app on one account, a fast first-run flow — against a free tier with no API access and a Linux build officially supported only on Ubuntu 24.04 and newer

  • Price & Value6.0/10

    Pro at $20/month is in line with mainstream assistants that offer no comparable isolation guarantee, but there is no annual discount at any tier, the $100 Max plan buys usage headroom rather than capability, and the free tier withholds API access

Overall7.6/10

Privacy Architecture 30% · Trust & Transparency 20% · Features 20% · Usability 20% · Price & Value 10%

See our rating methodology →

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Last updated: November 13, 2026By Juan Martinez

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